"Either mathematics is too big for the human mind or the human mind is more than a machine" ~ Godel
2. The consistency of the axioms cannot be proven within the system.
The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an "effective procedure" (e.g., a computer program, but it could be any sort of algorithm) is capable of proving all truths about the relations of the natural numbers (arithmetic). For any such system, there will always be statements about the natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system.
The second incompleteness theorem, an extension of the first, shows that such a system cannot demonstrate its own consistency.
In hindsight, the basic idea at the heart of the incompleteness theorem is rather simple. Gödel essentially constructed a formula that claims that it is unprovable in a given formal system.
If it were provable, it would be false, which contradicts the idea that in a consistent system, provable statements are always true.
Thus there will always be at least one true but unprovable statement. That is, for any computably enumerable set of axioms for arithmetic (that is, a set that can in principle be printed out by an idealized computer with unlimited resources), there is a formula that obtains in arithmetic, but which is not provable in that system.
To make this precise, however, Gödel needed to produce a method to encode statements, proofs, and the concept of provability as natural numbers. He did this using a process known as Gödel numbering.
Thread on his Incompleteness Theorem here