In November 1961, CIA inspector general Lyman B Kirkpatrick, authored a report 'Survey of the Cuban Operation', that remained classified top secret until 1996. Conclusions were:
1. The CIA exceeded its capabilities in developing the project from guerrilla support to overt armed action without any plausible deniability.
2, Failure to realistically assess risks and to adequately communicate information and decisions internally and with other government principals.
3. Insufficient involvement of leaders of the exiles.
4. Failure to sufficiently organize internal resistance in Cuba.
5. Failure to competently collect and analyze intelligence about Cuban forces.
6. Poor internal management of communications and staff.
7. Insufficient employment of high-quality staff.
8. Insufficient Spanish-speakers, training facilities and material resources.
9. Lack of stable policies and/or contingency plans.[/list]
In later years, the CIA's behavior in the event became the prime example cited for the psychology paradigm known as groupthink syndrome
1. The CIA exceeded its capabilities in developing the project from guerrilla support to overt armed action without any plausible deniability.
2, Failure to realistically assess risks and to adequately communicate information and decisions internally and with other government principals.
3. Insufficient involvement of leaders of the exiles.
4. Failure to sufficiently organize internal resistance in Cuba.
5. Failure to competently collect and analyze intelligence about Cuban forces.
6. Poor internal management of communications and staff.
7. Insufficient employment of high-quality staff.
8. Insufficient Spanish-speakers, training facilities and material resources.
9. Lack of stable policies and/or contingency plans.[/list]
In later years, the CIA's behavior in the event became the prime example cited for the psychology paradigm known as groupthink syndrome