Toasted Dolphin

Temporary Abandonment Procedures

It was not necessary to set the cement plug 3,300 feet below the mudline. The BP Macondo
team chose to do so in order to set the lockdown sleeve last in the temporary abandonment
sequence to minimize the chances of damage to the sleeve. Setting the lockdown sleeve
would require 100,000 pounds of force. The BP Macondo team sought to generate that
force by hanging 3,000 feet of drill pipe below the sleeve—hence the desire to set the
cement plug 3,000 feet below the mud line. BP’s desire to set the lockdown sleeve last did
not justify the risks its decision created. BP could have used other proven means to protect
the lockdown sleeve if set earlier in the process. It also did not need 3,000 feet of space
to generate 100,000 pounds of force. Merrick Kelley, the individual at BP in charge of
lockdown sleeves in the Gulf of Mexico, told Commission staff that he had recommended
setting the plug roughly 1,300 feet below the mud line (using heavier drill pipe), rather
than 3,300 feet down. That would have significantly increased the margin of safety for the
well.

The most troubling aspect of BP’s temporary abandonment procedure was BP’s decision
to displace mud from the riser before setting the surface cement plug or other barrier in
the production casing. During displacement of the riser, the BOP would be open, leaving
the cement at the bottom of the well (in the annulus and shoe track) as the only physical
barrier to flow up the production casing between the pay zone and the rig. Relying so
heavily on primary cement integrity put a significant premium on the negative-pressure
test and well monitoring during displacement, both of which are subject to human error.
BP’s decision under these circumstances to displace mud from the riser before setting
another barrier unnecessarily and substantially increased the risk of a blowout. BP could
have set the surface cement plug, or a mechanical plug, before displacing the riser. BP
could have replaced the mud in the wellbore with heavier mud sufficient to overbalance the
well. It is not apparent why BP chose not to do any of these things.

Criminal charges

In addition to the private lawsuits and civil governmental actions, the federal government charged multiple companies and five individuals with federal crimes.

In the November 2012 resolution of the federal charges against it, BP agreed to plead guilty to 11 felony counts related to the deaths of the 11 workers and paid a $4 billion fine. Transocean's plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge as part of its $1.4 billion fine.

In April 2012, the Justice Department filed the first criminal charge against Kurt Mix, a BP engineer, for obstructing justice by deleting messages showing that BP knew the flow rate was three times higher than initial claims by the company, and knew that "Top Kill" was unlikely to succeed, but claimed otherwise. Three more BP employees were charged in November 2012. Site managers Donald Vidrine and Robert Kaluza were charged with manslaughter for acting negligently in their supervision of key safety tests performed on the rig prior to the explosion, and failure to alert onshore engineers of problems in the drilling operation. David Rainey, BP's former vice-president for exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, was charged with obstructing Congress by misrepresenting the rate that oil was flowing out of the well. Lastly, Anthony Badalamenti, a Halliburton manager, was charged with instructing two employees to delete data related to Halliburton's cementing job on the oil well.

None of the charges against individuals resulted in any prison time, and no charges were levied against upper level executives. Anthony Badalementi was sentenced to one year probation, Donald Vidrine paid a $50,000 fine and received 10 months probation, Kurt Mix received 6 months probation, and David Rainey and Robert Kaluza were acquitted.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater ... _oil_spill